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This paper examines the role buyout specialists play in structuring the debt 
used to finance the LBO and in monitoring management in the post-LBO firm. 
We find that when buyout specialists control the majority of the post-LBO 
equity, the LBO transaction is likely to be financed with less short-term 
and/or senior debt and less likely to experience financial distress. We also find 
that buyout specialists have greater board representation on smaller boards, 
suggesting that they actively monitor managers, and that for these 
transactions, using debt with tighter terms does not significantly increase the 
firm's performance. In contrast, in all other transactions using such debt does 
significantly increase the firm's performance. These findings suggest that 
active monitoring by a buyout specialist substitutes for tighter debt terms in 
monitoring and motivating managers of LBOs.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Jensen (1986 and 1989) argues that leverage buyout 
transactions (LBOs) provide a “carrot” and “stick” mechanism to 
ameliorate the agency costs associated with free cash flow. First, 
managers' share ownership significantly increases, giving them 
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incentives to work harder (the ‘carrot’). Second, firms borrow heavily 
to finance the purchase of publicly held stock. The ensuing heavy debt 
burden forces managers to efficiently run the company to avoid default 
(the ‘stick’). Thus, a high debt level provides benefits that outweigh 
the higher expected bankruptcy and agency costs normally associated 
with high debt levels. In addition, third-party investors often acquire a 
large equity stake in the LBO, giving these investors incentives to 
motivate and monitor managers. Many studies have provided empirical 
evidence that supports Jensen's arguments (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Kaplan, 1989; Baker and Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990; Denis, 1994; 
Wruck, 1994). This study examines in more detail how the disciplining 
benefits of debt vary with the type of LBO equity investors, which in 
turn explains the cross-sectional variation in the structure of the debt 
used to finance LBO transactions. In particular, we examine the role 
buyout specialists play in structuring the debt to finance the LBO and 
in monitoring management in the post-LBO firm.  
 
In Jensen's argument (1986, p.324), it is not the total amount 
of debt outstanding per se but rather the amount of “debt service 
payments” per period that motivates managers to work harder. Thus, 
the structure or terms of the debt play an important role in how 
effectively debt motivates managers. Debt with a shorter maturity 
increases the debt service payments per period and increases the 
incentives for managers to work harder to increase firm value in the 
early stages of the LBO. In addition, private or senior bank loans are 
more likely to have restrictive covenants in the debt agreements 
compared to publicly held subordinated or ‘junk’ bonds (see Smith and 
Warner, 1979; James, 1987; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Begley, 1990; 
and Gilson and Warner, 1996). Furthermore, private lenders are more 
likely to closely monitor managers in the post-LBO firm than appointed 
trustees of public issues of subordinated bonds (see Smith and 
Warner, 1979; James, 1987; and Gilson and Warner, 1996). Thus, 
when LBOs are financed with more short-term and/or senior debt than 
with long-term and/or subordinate debt, debt is likely to play a more 
important role in monitoring and motivating managers in the post-LBO 
firm.  
 
Apart from debt, managers or third-party equity investors are 
another significant source of financing for LBOs. When third-party 
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equity investors can actively monitor managers at a relatively low cost, 
the benefits to using debt to monitor managers decline. Since 
bankruptcy and debt agency costs reduce the return to these equity 
investors, using debt to monitor managers can be expensive. Buyout 
specialists, such as Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (KKR), are likely to 
have a comparative advantage over other types of third-party equity 
investors in monitoring managers in highly levered firms, thus 
lowering the benefits from using tighter debt terms to motivate 
managers. Furthermore, buyout specialists are likely to be repeat 
players in the LBO debt market; with their reputations as ‘good’ 
borrowers at stake, lenders are likely to lend to them at easier terms. 
Thus, we hypothesize that LBOs controlled by buyout specialists are 
likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior debt because 
the monitoring benefits from debt are less for these LBOs.  
 
We examine the relationship between the characteristics of debt 
and equity financing for a sample of 64 LBOs completed from 1984 to 
1989. We find that when buyout specialists control the majority of the 
post-LBO equity, the LBO transaction is likely to be financed with less 
short-term and/or senior debt and subsequently less likely to default. 
We also find that in these transactions, buyout specialists have greater 
board representation on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively 
monitor managers. We also find that for these transactions, using 
more senior debt does not significantly increase the LBO firm's 
performance. In contrast, in all other transactions, using more senior 
debt does significantly increase the firm's performance. These findings 
suggest that active monitoring by a buyout specialist substitutes for 
tighter debt terms in monitoring and motivating managers. 
This study makes three contributions. First, this paper adds to 
previous research on the details of the structure of LBO debt and 
equity by examining their joint role in improving firm performance. 
The results here augment the findings in Denis (1994), a clinical paper 
that examines the changes in organizational form for two highly 
leveraged transactions. Denis focuses on changes in the organizational 
form – third-party investors, managerial stock ownership, 
compensation, and board composition – as they relate to increases in 
operating efficiencies. Denis finds that buyout specialists in the 
Safeway LBO significantly altered the organizational form, while 
managers, without the help of buyout specialists in the leveraged 
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recapitalization of Kroger, did not. Subsequently, firm value increased 
more for Safeway than for Kroger. We use a larger sample to include 
the role that debt structure plays as an alternative device to improve 
the performance of an LBO firm.  
This paper also extends the results of Kaplan and Stein (1993), 
who examine the changes in the structure of debt financing in 
management buyouts during the time period of 1980 to 1989. They 
argue that the buyout market in the late 1980s “overheated,” a 
showing that deals were financed using more publicly held 
subordinated debt, had smaller increases in post-LBO operating 
performance relative to buyout price, and were more likely to default. 
Our study adds to their results by examining the role that equity 
investors play in structuring the debt financing of LBOs. In our sample, 
we find in the late 1980s more transactions where either management 
or outside equity investors other than buyout specialists had a 
controlling interest in the LBO. These transactions are also more likely 
to default. Furthermore, as the amount of subordinate and/or long-
term debt used to finance these deals increased, the increase in post-
LBO performance declined. Thus, our results suggest one source of the 
“overheating” was a change in the type of equity investor participating 
in the LBO market.  
Second, this paper contributes to research on the determinants 
of debt structure. Previous researchers have investigated how the 
maturity and seniority of the debt varies with the extent of growth 
options in the firm's investment opportunity set, degree of industry 
regulation, firm size, firm quality, credit risk, and taxes (see Barclay 
and Smith, 1995a,b, and the references therein). This paper 
demonstrates that the structure of equity ownership or the identity of 
the borrowers also determines the structure of debt. Of course, the 
structure of equity ownership is endogenously determined with other 
firm characteristics examined in previous studies. Yet, a lender is likely 
to evaluate the impact that the motivations of the managers and/or 
equity investors have on the firm's ability to re-pay the loan, which in 
turn drives the choice of loan terms. This is likely to be particularly 
true in the case of LBOs where both relatively large amounts are 
borrowed and equity ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
investors. 
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Third, this paper examines another way in which active outside 
equity investors increase shareholder value. Some researchers have 
found that outside equity investors, i.e., blockholders, play an active 
role in the market for corporate control (see Mikkelson and Ruback, 
1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Brickley et al., 1988; Gilson, 
1990; Shivdasani, 1993; Peck, 1996; Denis and Serrano, 1996). 
Others have found that public pension funds pressure management 
into changing corporate governance structures or restructuring assets 
(see Romano, 1993; Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994; Wahal, 1996; 
Karpoff et al., 1996; Gillan and Starks, 1998; Del Guercio and 
Hawkins, 1999). Our results suggest that still another way that active 
equity investors can increase value is by restructuring the debt to 
minimize the expected bankruptcy and agency costs associated with 
debt.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and the sample. Section 3 documents the relation between the debt 
and equity structure used to finance LBO transactions in our sample. 
Section 4 investigates whether buyout specialists are better at market 
timing, which allows them to participate in better structured deals. 
Section 5 reports the results of tests of other explanations for why we 
find that transactions in which buyout specialists have a controlling 
interest are likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior 
debt. Section 6 provides evidence on the costs and benefits of using 
debt with tighter terms. Section 7 examines how buyout specialists 
monitor and motivate managers in the post-LBO firm. Section 8 
discusses potential selection biases with our sample. Section 9 states 
our conclusions.  
 
2. Sample and data  
2.1. Sample  
 
We construct a sample of 763 leveraged buyouts completed 
during 1984 to 1989 using three sources. First, we use the Mergers 
and Acquisitions magazine's annual top 100 acquisitions from 1984 to 
1989 and the Investment Dealers Digest mergers and acquisitions 
database available from Lexis/Nexis to identify LBOs completed from 
1984 through 1989. Second, we augment this sample using a keyword 
search on the full text of the Wall Street Journal from 1989 through 
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1993. Leveraged buyouts are often referenced in the Wall Street 
Journal after the completion of the transaction as well as when the 
transaction occurs.  
 
We require that certain data be publicly disclosed after the firm 
has gone private. We define public disclosures as any 10-K filing, 
proxy statement, or annual report available to provide data for our 
analysis. We search both for the existence of all three documents and 
the disclosure of a particular data item in any of the available 
documents when collecting our data.  
 
First, we require that public information is available on the 
structure of the debt financing used to complete the LBO transaction 
including a principal repayment schedule. This reduces the sample 
from 763 to 125 firms. This sample size is comparable to that of other 
studies. From a sample of management buyout offers (MBO) 
transactions (defined on page 317 as `at least one member of the 
incumbent management team obtains an equity interest in the new 
private firma) that exceed $100 million, Kaplan and Stein (1993) 
report in Table III, column (7), page 326, 71 firms that disclose data 
on debt structure including a principal repayment schedule over our 
sample period. Our sample of 125 is 76% larger than that of Kaplan 
and Stein (1993), most likely because we do not restrict our sample to 
MBOs or to large transactions.  
 
Second, we require that the firms in our sample have sufficient 
stock price data on Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP)/NASDAQ tapes to calculate buyout premiums. This reduces our 
sample to 92 firms. Firms that did not have sufficient stock price data 
to calculate a buyout premium typically arose from the purchase of 
part of a larger company. For example, Ethan Allen was once part of a 
publicly traded entity called Interco, a company composed of many 
businesses including Converse Inc., The Florsheim Shoe Co., and 
Broyhill Furniture Industries Inc., among others. In 1989, Ethan Allen 
was purchased by a group of the firm's senior managers using 
primarily debt financing. As a result, Ethan Allen was identified as an 
LBO, but our measure of a buyout premium cannot be calculated since 
Ethan Allen had no publicly traded stock before the LBO.  
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Third, we require that firms disclose compensation and 
ownership data for the first full post-buyout fiscal year. This 
requirement reduces our sample from 92 to 76 firms. Many LBOs are 
structured so that the firm becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
privately held holding company so that they are not required to 
disclose compensation and ownership data. For example, Mary Kay 
Cosmetics Inc. went private in 1985 and argued in their subsequent 
10-K filings that they were not required to disclose compensation and 
ownership data `pursant to General Instruction (J) (2) ( c ) of Form 
10-K.a This finding is consistent with prior researchers' arguments that 
one of the reasons companies go private is to avoid public disclosure 
(see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984).  
 
Finally, we require that data is available on Compustat the year 
after the deal is completed so that we can measure firm performance 
for the first full post-buyout fiscal year. Twelve firms were eliminated 
for failing to meet this requirement. GAF is an example of an LBO that 
meets the other data requirements but does not have publicly 
available data on post-LBO performance. In March 1989, GAF 
Corporation was acquired by a management group led by Samuel J. 
Heyman, GAF's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. The last proxy 
statement for the company was filed on January 1, 1989 disclosing the 
ownership and compensation structure of the company before the LBO 
transaction. After the transaction, one 10-K was filed on April 20, 
1990, disclosing information regarding the debt management, 
ownership, and compensation structure of the firm just after the LBO 
was completed and the financial performance for the firm for fiscal 
year 1989, the year prior to the LBO. The company did not file any 
subsequent financial statements that would provide data on post-LBO 
firm performance for our empirical tests. This last data requirement 
reduces our final sample to 64 firms.  
 
2.2. Structure of the debt  
 
Data used to measure the structure of the debt is obtained from 
public disclosures that describe the terms of the transaction. These 
disclosures provide a minimum principal repayment schedule over the 
subsequent five-year period for the total debt outstanding (both 
publicly issued debt and private debt such as bank loans) at the time 
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the transaction is completed. The longest maturity of the total 
outstanding debt is also disclosed. A variable we call average maturity 
is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then 
dividing by the total amount of debt outstanding. For the first five 
years the principal repayments used are those disclosed in the 
financial statements. For years six through the year of the longest 
maturity of the debt, we evenly amortize the remaining debt 
outstanding. We also provide alternative measures of maturity as 
percentage of debt due in more than one, two, three, four, and five 
years using the measures devised by Barclay and Smith (1995a). All of 
our measures of maturity are statistically significantly positively 
correlated with each other. These maturity variables measure the 
minimum debt obligations due to the lender and thus what we call the 
relative tightness of the debt terms. These maturity measures exclude 
call features of the debt that effectively shorten the maturity of the 
debt. Debt calls, however, are at the discretion of the borrower. We do 
not expect that borrowers would exercise the call option and pay back 
the debt sooner during periods of financial distress. Excluding the 
effect of call options creates thus a more conservative measure of the 
tightness of debt terms for the purposes of our tests.  
 
We also calculate a standard duration measure by discounting 
the principal repayments. We calculate four duration measures using a 
discount rate of 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. We re-run our tests using 
these measures of duration. The results continue to hold when we use 
an interest rate of 5% but not when we use higher interest rates. At 
higher interest rates, duration is not significantly related to our 
explanatory variables. However, using higher interest rates reduces 
the cross-sectional dispersion in our duration measure; the standard 
deviation as a percentage of the mean decreases by more than 50% 
when using higher interest rates. Reducing the dispersion in the 
independent variable reduces the power of the tests.  
Public disclosures also provide information about the amount of 
different types of debt that we use to create the following five classes 
of debt based on their seniority: (1) senior bank debt (highest 
seniority), which includes term loan facilities, revolving loan facilities, 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) facilities, tender offer facilities, 
partnership loans, and other bank debt excluding bridge financing; (2) 
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bridge financing (of equal seniority to senior bank debt); (3) senior 
secured notes (second highest seniority), which includes senior 
extendable notes and senior increasing rate notes; (4) senior notes 
(third highest seniority), which includes unsecured sinking fund 
debentures; (5) senior subordinated note (fourth highest seniority); 
(6) subordinated notes (lowest seniority); (7) industrial revenue bonds 
(unclassified seniority), which includes equipment financing, mortgage 
notes, capitalized lease obligations, and real estate backed loans; and 
(8) other (unclassified seniority), which is the amount of debt 
classified as ‘other’ on the financial statements, and includes 
commercial paper. We do not classify the seniority of industrial 
revenue bonds because default is likely to lead to the creditor seizing 
the asset backing the financing rather than forcing the firm into 
bankruptcy. The seniority of ‘other’ is not classified because we lack 
information other than for commercial paper, a negligible percentage 
of this category. Using the above classifications, we develop an 
average seniority measure equal to [(bridge financing + bank debt) *5 
+ senior secured debt*4 + senior debt*3 + senior subordinated 
debt*2 + subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other -
industrial revenue bonds]. This measure will be 5 when all senior bank 
debt is used to finance the LBO and 1 when all subordinated debt, i.e., 
‘junk’ bonds, is used. We also provide the percentage of the type of 
debt in each seniority class as alternative measures of seniority.  
 
Ideally, we would like to have the individual repayment schedule 
for each issuance of debt so that we could calculate separately the 
average maturity for debt that was issued at the time the LBO was 
completed and any previously issued debt. An individual repayment 
schedule would allow us to measure the average maturity for different 
seniority classes of debt. All our measures of maturity are statistically 
significantly negatively correlated with all our measures of seniority. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies that have found that 
privately held senior bank debt tends to be short-term, while publicly 
held subordinate debt tends to be long-term (see Gilson and Warner, 
1996). We use our variables of average maturity and average seniority 
in our tests. We also use as alternative measures of debt structure the 
percentage of debt that tends to be short-term and senior (bridge 
financing and senior secured notes) and the percentage of debt that 
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tends to be long-term and subordinate (senior subordinated debt and 
subordinated debt). 
2.3. Equity financing  
 
Data on equity financing is also obtained from the disclosure 
that describes the terms of the transaction. Equity financing is 
expressed as a percentage of newly issued common stock of the 
buyout firm provided by different types of investors. While some 
equity financing is provided by issuing other types of stock, common is 
both used in every LBO transaction and represents the largest amount 
of the equity financing. It also has the most voting power.  
 
2.4. Financial distress  
 
Data from the Wall Street Journal is used to determine financial 
distress within two, four, and six years after the buyout is completed. 
We also search the bankruptcy reports available in Lexis/Nexis for 
instances where the LBOs in the sample are either restructured or 
enter bankruptcy. Our definition of financial distress is either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors 
accept less than full compensation for their original debt position by 
either reductions in stated interest or principal, extensions of debt 
maturity, or grants of equity interests to creditors. Our definition of 
financial distress is the same as both Denis and Denis (1995) and 
Gilson (1989). Table 1 reports the distribution of LBOs over the sample 
period, cross-tabulated with the number of LBOs with available 
financial data and financial distress within two, four, and six years. The 
number of LBOs shown is comparable to that in other studies (see 
Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; and Kaplan and Stein, 1993). While there 
is no apparent relationship between data availability and financial 
distress over the sample period, we do find that LBOs completed in 
1986 and 1988 are more likely to undergo financial distress. This 
finding is consistent with Kaplan and Stein (1993), who find that 
‘overheating’ in the buyout market in the late 1980s led to LBOs that 
were more likely to experience financial distress. In the remaining 
tests, we use the incidence of financial distress within six years of the 
LBO as our measure of default.  
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2.5. Board composition and managerial compensation  
 
Data on board composition and managerial compensation is 
obtained from public disclosures that are filed within one year after the 
LBO is completed. We use data reflecting the earliest disclosed change 
in post-buyout board composition and the data reflecting 
compensation structure for the first full fiscal year after the buyout is 
completed. Compensation structure includes the CEO's common stock 
ownership, common stock options granted, total cash compensation, 
salary and bonus (when disclosed), and the existence of stock 
appreciation rights or options granted for securities other than 
common stock. We also collect data on the existence of a bonus plan. 
However, since only five firms failed to report a bonus plan, we 
exclude this data item from subsequent tests, but not the five firms.  
 
2.6. Other firm characteristics  
 
Data to measure goodwill and total assets on completion of the 
LBO are collected using statements filed as part of public disclosure of 
the LBO. Compustat is used to collect data on operating income before 
depreciation and amortization, EBITDA (item #13), total assets (item 
#6), total sales (item #12), total shareholder's equity (item #216), 
retained earnings (item #36), total current liabilities (item #5), and 
debt in current liabilities (item #34) for the first full post-buyout fiscal 
year. We also collect data on these items for the next four post-LBO 
fiscal years when it is available. Data on EBITDA, total assets, and 
total sales is also collected for the full fiscal year prior to the LBO. We 
collect data on EBITDA and total sales for the prior ten pre-buyout 
years when it is available. Following Kaplan and Stein (1993) we use 
this data to calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate in 
operating margins (EBITDA/sales) as a measure of risk. CRSP monthly 
return data is used to construct the average industry raw return using 
two-digit SIC codes for each firm in the sample. The return measure is 
the average holding period return of all firms in the industry for two, 
four, and six years after the buyout.  
 
We use data from the Wall Street Journal and the CRSP tapes to 
calculate a buyout premium. The buyout premium is calculated using 
the final buyout offer price and the stock price 30 days before the 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2001): pg. 101-147. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
12 
 
announcement date. The announcement date is defined as the first 
report of any buyout activity, including rumors. In the case of offers 
that are not all cash, the buyout price per share is calculated by 
dividing the total buyout price by the number of shares outstanding. 
We use the Wall Street Journal to determine whether a hostile bid was 
made for the firm. Data on asset sales during the first year of the LBO 
are also collected from the Wall Street Journal.  
 
3. The relation between the structure of debt and 
equity financing in LBOs  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the type of investors 
providing equity financing. Buyout specialists such as KKR, Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd., and Kelso Company are the majority of the 
investors, providing, on average, 51.64% of the equity financing. 
Management provides, on average, 20.03%, and miscellaneous 
corporations such as Campeau Corp., Lowes Corp., and Hallmark 
Cards provide, on average, 13.14%. The transactions financed by 
miscellaneous corporations are best described as “takeovers.” For 
example, Campeau's acquisition of Allied Stores was structured as a 
leveraged buyout. The remainder of the equity financing is provided by 
ESOPs, insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit 
corporations, individual investors, and individually organized limited 
partnerships.  
 
Table 2 also shows that buyout specialists have majority control 
in 40 or 63% of the deals. We define majority control as owning 50% 
or more of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one 
investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage 
of common stock; in two firms, buyout specialists are assigned 
control; in one firm, management; and in three firms, other outside 
equity investors. In the remainder of our tests we use dummy 
variables to indicate when management, buyout specialists, or other 
outside equity investors have control. We include ESOP controlled 
LBOs in the management-controlled group because top management 
owns stock in the ESOP and often acts as a trustee directing the voting 
of the ESOP shares. We use a dummy variable for control because 
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investors with majority ownership have enough votes to influence the 
policies of the firm.  
 
These three types of controlling investors – management, 
buyout specialists, and other outside investors – are likely to have 
different incentives to improve post-LBO firm value and avoid default. 
On the one hand, when management owns almost all of the equity, 
they have powerful incentives to work hard to increase equity value. 
On the other hand, when management owns almost all of the equity, 
conflicts between debtholders and shareholders are likely to be 
relatively more severe for two reasons. First, managers have the 
means to transfer wealth to themselves from debtholders via 
managerial decisions about the allocation of the firm's resources. 
Second, when managers own almost all of the equity, all of the gains 
from such decisions will accrue to the managers and free-riding by 
outside shareholders is minimized. For such firms, conflicts between 
shareholders and debt holders can be minimized by using senior bank 
and/or short-term debt (see Smith and Warner, 1979; Barclay and 
Smith, 1995a, and the references therein).  
 
Like management, buyout specialists also have incentives to 
increase equity value. Most buyout specialist firms are structured as 
limited liability partnerships. These partnerships raise buyout funds 
from institutional investors but often the buyout specialists who 
manage the fund are also principals and share directly in the increase 
in LBO equity value (see The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1986, p.1 
and August 30, 1986, p.3). Unlike management, they have 
disincentives to expropriate the wealth of debtholders. While managers 
are likely to participate in only one LBO deal in their careers, buyout 
specialists profit by doing repeated deals. Since they are likely to 
return to debt markets, it is important for them to retain their 
reputation as ‘good’ borrowers to insure their access to debt capital on 
relatively favorable terms. In addition, since buyout specialists are 
involved in many LBOs, they are likely to become skilled in monitoring 
managers of LBOs. If the cost of monitoring management is less than 
the costs of using tighter debt terms to motivate managers, buyout 
specialists are likely to use less short-term and/or senior debt to 
finance the LBO transaction.  
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The majority of other types of outside investors are corporations 
that have structured the acquisition of another company as an LBO. 
The acquisition becomes a subsidiary and the LBO debt is issued in the 
acquired firm's name. The managers of the parent company are likely 
to have less incentive than either management or buyout specialists to 
increase the equity value of the LBO for two reasons. First, the 
managers of these corporations often have no direct equity investment 
in these companies; they have used corporate resources to purchase 
the LBO subsidiary. Second, the LBO performance will increase the 
wealth of the managers of the parent company only indirectly through 
the effects of incentive compensation such as accounting-based 
bonuses, stock options, stock value, etc. To the extent that the LBO 
constitutes only a portion of the parent company's total portfolio of 
projects, the performance of the target LBO will have less impact on 
the compensation of the parent's top management. Furthermore, the 
parent's executives may be relatively inexperienced in monitoring 
management in the highly levered subsidiary. These types of outside 
investors are likely to find using debt with tighter terms a relatively 
low-cost way of motivating managers. In turn, lenders, cognizant of 
these incentive problems with LBO subsidiaries, are likely to prefer to 
lend more short-term and/or senior debt, which will give them more 
leverage over management.  
 
The category of other types of outside investors includes 
insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, 
individuals, and individually organized limited partnerships. These 
investors have less incentive to monitor LBO management. In the 
majority of these cases, the purchase of LBO equity is a passive 
investment. This is reflected in the fact that these investors in our 
sample never purchase a controlling interest. Even in the two cases 
where these investors were assigned control because they owned the 
largest percentage of stock, they still did not own a majority. In these 
companies, stock ownership is less concentrated, reducing the 
incentives of any one investor to increase equity value. These 
investors are likely to rely on tighter debt terms as a way to motivate 
management. At the same time, lenders prefer to lend debt with 
tighter terms.  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2001): pg. 101-147. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
15 
 
Table 3 shows how debt characteristics vary with the type of 
controlling equity investor. As we predicted, buyout specialist-
controlled LBOs tend to use less short-term and/or senior debt to 
finance the LBO than those controlled by either management or other 
outside investors. Both our measure of average maturity and the 
percentage of debt due in more than five years are, on average, 
greater for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs. Table 3 also shows that 
management-controlled LBOs, on average, use more senior debt and 
use less senior subordinated debt than buyout specialist-controlled 
LBOs. LBOs controlled by other outside investors, on average, use less 
subordinated debt. Table 3 also shows that buyout specialist-controlled 
LBOs are less likely to default than either management-or other 
outside investor-controlled LBOs. All these results are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This finding suggests that tighter 
debt terms, in fact, increase the incidence of default in LBOs and so 
can act as a tool to motivate management. In the following sections, 
we test alternative explanations to these findings.  
 
4. Are buyout specialists better at market timing?  
 
Kaplan and Stein (1993) present evidence that ‘overheating’ in 
the LBO market in the late 1980s led to poorly structured deals. One 
explanation for our finding that buyout specialists participate in deals 
that are less likely to default is that they participated in more deals 
early on in our sample period. Table 4 shows the frequency of deals 
completed for each year in our sample by different types of controlling 
investors, cross-tabulated with the type of debt used and the incidence 
of default. Consistent with Kaplan and Stein, we find that both the 
number of deals and default rates increased in the late 1980s. Yet, 
Table 4 shows that the buyout specialists in our sample participated in 
this ‘overheated’ market as well as other investors. We find, in our 
sample, both that buyout specialists increased the number of deals 
that they completed in the late 1980s and more of these were likely to 
default. The default rate for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs is less 
for each year than for either management-or other outside equity 
investor-controlled LBOs, except for 1985, when only five deals by all 
types of investors were completed, and 1989, when only one deal 
defaulted.  
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Consistent with Kaplan and Stein we also find that, on average, 
the amount of subordinate debt financing increased in the late 1980s. 
In our sample, senior subordinated notes and subordinated debt as a 
percentage of total debt grew from an average value of 11% (median 
value of 3%) in 1984 to an average value of 32% (median value of 
36%) in 1989. As Table 4 shows, again except for 1985, we find that 
buyout specialist-controlled deals consistently used, on average, less 
senior debt and/or debt of longer maturity than deals controlled by 
either management or other outside investors.  
 
Interestingly, the findings in Table 4 suggest that one potential 
source of the ‘overheating’ documented by Kaplan and Stein is the 
increase in deals completed by management and, particularly, other 
outside investors in the late 1980s. We find that deals completed by 
these investors have a higher incidence of default. Kaplan and Stein 
also find that, in the late 1980s, an increase in the use of subordinate 
publicly held ‘junk’ bonds to finance deals that produced smaller 
increases in post-LBO performance. We also find evidence (presented 
in Section 6) that when deals were financed with less short-term 
and/or senior debt and more with long-term and/or subordinate debt, 
there is less of an increase in post-LBO performance. These findings 
hold only for management-or other outside investor-controlled deals. 
Again, this suggests that one source of ‘overheating’ in the LBO 
market was the change in the type of investors controlling the deals 
and a choice of debt structure that failed to adequately monitor 
management.  
 
5. Are buyout specialists better at picking deals 
that ex ante can be financed with less short term 
and/or senior debt?  
5.1. Growth options and the duration of assets  
 
The choice of debt structure may also be related to the extent of 
growth options in the firm's investment opportunity set (see Barclay 
and Smith, 1995a). Buyout specialists may participate in the deals in 
which growth options drive the choice of maturity structure rather than 
any monitoring by buyout specialists. Following Barclay and Smith we 
use the ratio of the market value of the firm's assets to their book 
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value as a proxy for growth options. We estimate the market value of 
the firm's assets as the book value of assets when they are written up 
to reflect the buyout price on completion of the transaction. To create 
the ratio, we use the book value of assets for the year before the 
transaction. Table 5 shows there is no difference in our measure of 
growth options between firms in which buyout specialists have control 
and other LBOs. The ratio of buyout price to book value of assets can 
also reflect over or under pricing of the LBO rather than the extent of 
growth options. If this ratio is a noisy measure of growth options it can 
make it difficult to find statistically significant differences in growth 
options between different types of investor-controlled LBOs. It is likely 
that in our sample there is little dispersion in the extent of the firm's 
growth options. LBO candidates are likely to have high levels of free 
cash flow (see Jensen, 1986 and 1989; and Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) 
and thus are more likely to be clustered towards the “assets in place” 
end of the growth options continuum (see Myers, 1977). In our sample 
the extent of the firm's growth options may explain little of the cross-
sectional variation in debt characteristics.  
 
We also include EBITDA/(EBITDA + asset sales) as an 
alternative measure of the duration of the assets. In LBOs, value can 
be created by some combination of asset sales and improvements in 
operating cash flows. When the gains from an LBO primarily come 
from asset sales, debt financing is more likely to be short-term bank 
loans because asset sales are usually arranged at the time of the 
transaction. Thus, the proceeds from the asset sales can be used to 
pay of debt early on. In contrast, when the gains primarily come from 
improvements in operational efficiencies, then long-term debt is more 
likely to be used to finance the LBO. It is possible that buyout 
specialists are more likely to participate in deals where improvements 
in operational efficiencies account for a larger proportion of post-LBO 
value creation. Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in (EBITDA/EBITDA + asset sales) between firms in which 
buyout specialists have control and those controlled by other types of 
investors.  
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5.2. Buyout transaction  
 
It is possible that the structure of the debt is determined in 
large part by the control contest that precedes the ultimate buyout 
transaction. In an attempt to secure credible financing, bidders for the 
firm may have used a particular type of debt because such funds were 
readily available rather than because of the monitoring benefits from 
various types of debt. On the one hand, Kaplan and Stein argue that in 
the late 1980s deals were both overpriced and financed with more 
subordinate, publicly held, ‘junk’ bonds because these sources of funds 
were readily available. On the other hand, private short-term financing 
may be easier to arrange during ‘heated’ buyout contests. It is also 
possible that buyout specialists use less short-term and/or senior debt 
because of characteristics of the buyout contest in which they engage.  
 
We use four measures to capture the characteristics of the 
buyout transactions. First, we collect data on the number of LBOs with 
hostile bidders. Second, we include the frequency of deals done after 
1985 to proxy for the ‘overheating’ phenomenon documented by 
Kaplan and Stein. Third, we use as measures of overpayment the 
buyout premium paid and the amount of goodwill scaled by total 
assets. Goodwill is measured by the difference between the buyout 
price and the book value of the assets at the time the transaction is 
completed.  
 
We recognize, however, that both measures are noisy proxies 
for overpayment. Using the buyout premium assumes that firms that 
pay higher premiums are more likely to overpay and yet some buyouts 
justify a higher buyout premium. Similarly, lower premiums can also 
reflect overpayment when this premium is high relative to post-LBO 
firm value. Likewise, higher goodwill can be due to overpayment but 
also due to older assets or less tangible assets (for example, for a 
service firm) with lower book values or to a buyout with higher post-
buyout value.  
 
Table 5 shows that a smaller number of management-controlled 
LBOs had a hostile bidder during the buyout contest than other types 
of LBOs. It is likely that in management-controlled LBOs, management 
owns enough pre-buyout equity to successfully deter a potential 
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competitive bidder (see Peck, 1996). Table 5 also shows that deals 
controlled by buyout specialists have, on average, statistically 
significantly higher buyout premiums than deals controlled by 
management. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
buyout specialists both overpaid for LBOs and used more readily 
available ‘junk’ bond debt. Alternatively, buyout specialists may have 
participated in deals that generated greater post-LBO value. In the 
following section, we provide evidence that supports this alternative 
explanation.  
 
5.3. Firm performance  
 
It is likely that LBOs that have higher expected cash flows are 
easier to finance with long-term and/or publicly held subordinated 
debt. Thus, one explanation for our findings is that buyout specialists 
participate in ‘better’ deals. Following Kaplan (1989) and Denis (1994), 
we use three measures for performance – operating cash flows scaled 
by total assets (EBITDA/total assets), sales (EBITDA/total sales), and 
asset sales (asset sales/total assets). We report the levels of these 
measures as well as the percentage change from before to after the 
LBO. Because the book value of assets are written up to reflect the 
LBO purchase price, earlier researchers adjust the pre-LBO book value 
of assets (usually by increasing pre-LBO total assets by the difference 
in pre-LBO book value and the purchase price) “to make inter temporal 
comparisons meaningful” (p. 226, Kaplan, 1989; Denis, 1994). 
Similarly, we also adjust our measure of pre-LBO total assets. As a 
measure of pre-LBO total assets, we use total assets measured at the 
end of the first post-LBO fiscal year, which reflects the price paid for 
the LBO minus any asset sales that occurred during the first year. Of 
course, if the firm sold off assets that contributed to EBITDA in the 
pre-LBO year, this would erroneously inflate our measure of pre-LBO 
performance. Thus, we add back asset sales to our measure of total 
assets to measure performance in the pre-LBO year.  
 
Table 5 shows that there is no difference among the three type 
of investor-controlled LBOs in operating cash flows, scaled by either 
total assets or sales, in the fiscal year before the LBO. There is 
substantial evidence, however, that after the LBO, operating cash 
flows increase significantly (see Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990). It is 
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likely that lenders use pro-forma financial statements that project an 
increase in operating cash flows when they are negotiating debt terms. 
The findings in Table 5 suggest that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs 
perform better than the other types. Buyout specialist-controlled LBOs, 
on average, have higher operating cash flows scaled by total assets in 
their first post-LBO year than outside-investor controlled LBOs. We 
also find that this better performance is sustained. While not reported 
in the tables, we also find that (EBITDA/total assets) are statistically 
significantly higher for years two, four, and five. Compared to 
management LBOs, buyout specialist LBOs, on average, have a larger 
percentage increase in operating cash flows scaled by total sales. This 
result is statistically significant at the 10% level. While not reported in 
the table, we also find that buyout specialist LBOs, on average, have 
statistically significant higher operating cash flows scaled by total 
assets for post-LBO years three and four. Buyout specialist controlled 
deals also have higher asset sales and this result is statistically 
significant at the 10% level, as Table 5 shows.  
 
These higher levels of post-LBO operating performance in firms 
controlled by buyout specialists could be because they pick deals that 
are better ex ante or they more effectively monitor management in the 
post-LBO firm. Similarly, buyout specialists may pick deals that have 
more assets that can be profitably sold off or they may play a more 
active role instigating the sell-off of assets. In either case, lenders are 
likely to extend easier terms to buyout specialists.  
 
5.4. Firm size and leverage  
 
Larger firms are likely to have better access to public debt 
markets and are thus less likely to rely on private debt, which tends to 
be both short-term and senior. Buyout specialists may be more likely 
to participate in larger deals; thus, we also investigate whether buyout 
specialist-controlled LBOs are larger than the others. We use both total 
sales and the total book value of assets as a proxy for firm size. Table 
5 shows that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs are not statistically 
significantly larger than other LBOs.  
 
It is also likely that firms that borrow more use more long-term 
debt. If buyout specialists borrow more than other investors, then it 
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possible that these deals are financed using less short-term and/or 
senior debt. We measure leverage as total debt used to finance the 
deal divided by book value of assets, which reflects the buyout price. 
Table 5 shows that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs do not differ 
significantly from others in the amount of leverage used.  
 
5.5. Risk  
 
Credit risk will increase when expected future cash flows are 
more variable or riskier. As credit risk increases, lenders want to be 
re-paid sooner and use more restrictive debt terms (see Diamond, 
1993). Thus, buyout specialists may participate in LBOs with less risky 
cash flows which may be easier to finance with less short-term and/ or 
senior debt. Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in our measure of risk between buyout specialist-controlled 
LBOs and other types of LBOs. 
5.6. Equity financing  
 
Buyout specialists may provide more equity financing that 
prevents an LBO from defaulting. If they have a reputation for doing 
so, lenders may be willing to extend easier terms to them. We use 
total capital contributed by equity holders (defined as total 
shareholders' equity minus retained earnings) divided by total assets 
as a measure of equity financing. Table 5 shows that buyout specialist-
controlled LBOs, on average, do not contribute more capital than 
management-controlled LBOs. While not reported in the table, we also 
do not find that buyout specialist firms have significantly higher levels 
of contributed capital in post-LBO years two through five. Buyout 
specialist-controlled LBOs have, on average, a higher dollar amount of 
contributed capital in the first post-LBO year than other outside 
investors. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. It is 
likely that as experts in the buyout market, buyout specialists have 
easier access to capital than other types of outside equity investors. In 
addition, since buyouts are their primary business, buyout specialists 
are likely to commit more capital to the LBO than other outside 
investors. Yet, when other outside investors invest a lower amount in 
the LBO, they have less incentive to monitor management.  
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5.7. Cross-sectional regressions explaining debt 
structure  
 
Table 6 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions 
explaining the choice of debt structure. Since we do not have 
observations for all the firms in our sample for the amount of equity 
capital contributed and risk, we exclude these observations from our 
regressions. When we include these variables in our regressions our 
results are qualitatively the same, but the statistical significance of the 
regression is reduced. The results show that buyout specialist-
controlled LBOs are significantly more likely to use debt with longer 
maturity and less likely to use senior debt after controlling for other 
variables. We hypothesize that active monitoring by buyout specialists 
decreases the monitoring benefits of short-term and/or senior debt. In 
the next two sections, we provide evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 
6. Is using short term and/or senior debt to 
5nance LBOs more costly?  
6.1. The likelihood of default  
 
Using less debt that is short-term and/or senior is beneficial 
when it decreases the likelihood of default and associated bankruptcy 
costs. We test in our LBO sample whether deals financed with such 
debt, in fact, are more likely to default.  
 
We estimate parameters of a logitistic regression, which 
includes various measures for the degree to which the debt is senior or 
short-term. We also control for other variables that are likely to 
increase the likelihood of default. As post-LBO operating cash flows 
and proceeds for asset sales increase, the firm is likely to have more 
cash to cover debt obligations. If the equity investors have overpaid 
for the firm, they are more likely to have either insufficient post-LBO 
cash flows to cover debt obligations or to have structured the deal 
poorly. Palepu and Wruck (1992) also find that defensive leveraged 
transactions are more likely to be poorly structured. Thus, as in 
Section 5, we use as proxies of overpayment and defensive 
transactions the buyout premium, the presence of a hostile bidder, 
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goodwill/ total assets, and a dummy variable for whether the deal was 
completed after 1985.  
 
Denis and Denis (1995) show that ex post macroeconomic 
variables contributed to the financial distress for leverage 
recapitalizations. It is possible that LBOs default because either the 
market performed poorly or the industry they are in performed poorly. 
Thus, we include a measure of post-LBO industry performance. The 
return measure is the average holding period return of all firms in the 
industry for two, four, and six years after the completion of the 
buyout. Monthly returns are used to calculate the holding period 
return. Table 5 shows that industry performance is not statistically 
significantly higher for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs than for other 
LBOs. Since we are measuring the incidence of default over six years, 
we use in our regression the average holding period return for six 
years after the completion of the buyout.  
 
We also examine expected debt coverage as a direct method to 
determine whether firms are able to meet their future debt obligations. 
We measure expected debt coverage as EBITDA for the first post-LBO 
year divided by the amount of debt due in one, two, three, four, and 
five years. Table 5 shows that expected debt coverage is statistically 
significantly higher for buyout specialist-controlled firms than other 
outside investor-controlled firms for the first post-LBO year. The 
combination of using debt with longer maturity, which lowers the per 
period debt obligation, and higher post-LBO cash flows increases the 
debt coverage for buyout specialist-controlled firms.  
 
Since firms that are larger and have less leverage are less likely 
to default, we also include size (book value of total assets) and 
leverage (total debt/total assets) in our regression. We also include a 
dummy variable for whether the LBO is controlled by a buyout 
specialist. This allows us to test our earlier result reported in Table 3 
that control by buyout specialists decreases the likelihood of default 
even after controlling for other variables that could cause default.  
 
Table 7 reports the results of logit regressions for the likelihood 
of default. These regressions show that as more short-term and/or 
senior debt is used the likelihood of default increases. Table 7 also 
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shows that LBOs controlled by buyout specialists are less likely to 
default after controlling for other variables. While not reported in the 
tables when we re-run the regressions using the percentage of bridge 
financing, senior secured notes, senior subordinated debt and 
subordinated debt, as alternative measures of seniority and maturity, 
we get qualitatively same results.  
 
Since we do not make observations for all the firms in our 
sample for the amount of equity capital contributed and risk, we 
exclude these observations from our regressions. When we include 
these variables in our regressions, our results are qualitatively the 
same, but the statistical significance of the regression is reduced.  
 
We do not collect data on bankruptcy costs associated with 
default in our sample because this data is very costly to obtain. Other 
researchers, however, have documented the costs of bankruptcy. 
Weiss (1990) estimates that direct bankruptcy costs are on average 
3.1% of total book value of debt plus the market value of equity. 
Anrade and Kaplan (1998) estimate that the costs of financial distress 
for a sample of highly levered transactions between 10% to 23% of 
firm value. We assume that these estimates of the costs of financial 
distress for the firms in our sample would be comparable.  
 
More importantly, financial distress in LBOs is likely to reduce 
the return on equity holders' investment. Anrade and Kaplan estimate 
post-buyout equity investors earn an average total nominal return of 
17% for a sample of highly leveraged transactions that become 
financially distressed. There are likely to be similar losses from 
financial distress for investors in our sample. Thus, equity investors 
have incentives to arrange the terms of the debt to avoid these costs 
when they can.  
 
6.2. The monitoring benefits of short-term and/or 
senior debt  
 
Wruck (1990) and Jensen (1989) argue that default and 
bankruptcy may have benefits that offset its costs. In an extension of 
that fundamental point, while more short-term and/or more senior 
debt increases the incidence of default, it is also likely to create 
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powerful incentives for managers to improve operating performance. 
Furthermore, Kaplan (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan provide evidence 
that when the threat of default fails to motivate management, default 
serves as a mechanism to re-organize the firm more profitably. Buyout 
specialists may find that actively monitoring managers, themselves, is 
less costly than using debt as a disciplining device. When buyout 
specialists control the LBO and actively monitor managers, firm 
performance will improve with or without using debt with tighter 
terms. In other LBOs, the use of tighter debt terms is likely to have a 
greater impact on managerial incentives and firm performance.  
 
Table 8 reports the results of a regression to explain post-LBO 
changes in firm performance. We measure post-LBO changes as the 
percentage change in (EBITDA/total sales) from the year before the 
LBO to the first post-LBO year. As explanatory variables, we use the 
firm's debt structure and equity structure. We use a dummy variable 
for firms where buyout specialists have control and multiply the debt 
structure variables by this dummy since we expect that the use of debt 
in these firms to improve performance is likely to be different than in 
other firms. We also include the firm's pre-LBO operating cash flows 
scaled by sales, since firms that have a higher percentage change are 
likely to have a lower base to begin with. We also include a dummy 
variable for LBOs that occur after 1985 to control for ‘overheating’ in 
the LBO market.  
 
Table 9 reports the results of regressions similar to those of 
Table 8. The exception is that we measure post-LBO changes as the 
relative (rank value) percentage change in (EBITDA/total sales) from 
the year before the LBO to the first post-LBO year. We use rank values 
because it reduces the influence of outliers in our regression. This is 
particularly a problem when (EBITDA/total sales) before the LBO is 
small, since a change in (EBITDA/total sales) becomes an even larger 
percentage change. For example, a firm in our sample (controlled by a 
buyout specialist) went from (EBITDA/total sales) of 0.04417 to 
0.11502, which represented a 160.387% change. This was over ten 
times the average value of 15.951% for the entire sample. As the 
results in Tables 8 and 9 show, when we do not use rank values the 
results are qualitatively the same but the statistical significance of the 
regression is lowered.  
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We find that as non buyout specialist-controlled LBOs use more 
senior debt, the change in their operating performance is greater. We 
find the opposite relation for buyout specialist LBOs; in an equivalent 
test estimating a regression using only a sample of buyout specialist-
controlled LBOs, the coefficient on the amount of senior debt used is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. These finding suggest 
that more restrictive debt terms increase managerial incentives and 
firm performance only when the control of buyout specialists is absent.  
 
Rather than increases in operating efficiency, lenders are more 
likely to be interested in the ultimate level of cash flows available to 
meet debt obligations relative to the total capital invested in the LBO, 
which, on average, they provide 87.62% (median value of 85.58%). 
Thus, the terms of the debt are likely to have a greater impact on the 
level of post-LBO performance rather than the change. As an 
alternative measure of post-LBO performance, we use post-LBO 
operating cash flows scaled by total capital measured at the end of the 
first post-LBO fiscal year, calculated as total assets minus non debt 
current liabilities. Table 10 reports the results of this alternative 
measure of post-LBO performance. The results are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in Tables 8 and 9, but more statistically significant. 
We also re-run the regressions in Tables 8}10 using the percentage of 
bridge financing, senior secured notes, senior subordinated debt and 
subordinated debt, as alternative measures of seniority and maturity 
and get qualitatively same results.  
 
7. How do buyout specialists monitor managers in 
the post-LBO firm?  
 
One way that outside equity investors can improve managerial 
incentives is to provide greater incentive compensation. As part of 
arranging the buyout, equity investors are also likely to play a role in 
restructuring management's compensation package. Denis (1994) 
provides evidence that improved incentive compensation and higher 
managerial ownership arranged by the LBO specialist, such as KKR, 
leads to greater post-LBO value creation. Thus, it is likely that buyout 
specialists improve incentive compensation in the post-LBO firm. Table 
11 reports differences in various measures of incentive compensation 
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buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and other LBOs, using similar 
measures as reported in Denis. The results in Table 11 suggest that, 
other than the larger amount of stock held by management in 
management-controlled LBOs, there are no statistically significant 
differences in the structure of incentive compensation between firms 
with the three types of controlling investors.  
 
Outside investors can also monitor and motivate management 
by their board membership. Board members have access to company 
information to monitor the firm's on-going operations; to direct 
operating strategy; and to evaluate management for an increase in 
compensation or removal from the firm. Prior researchers have shown 
that independent board members monitor managers (see Weisbach, 
1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). Table 12 
shows how composition of the board varies with the type of controlling 
investor. Buyout specialists take more representation on the boards 
they control than do other types of outside investors. Buyout 
specialist-controlled LBOs also have smaller boards. Yermack (1996) 
provides evidence that smaller boards are more effective than larger 
ones. Thus, buyout specialists are likely to more effectively monitor 
managers by having more seats on the board and by having smaller 
boards. These findings support our hypothesis that buyout specialists 
are more active monitors than other outside controlling investors.  
 
8. Potential sample selection bias  
 
Because our initial sample of 125 LBOs is reduced to 64, our 
results may be driven by a sample selection bias. While our sample 
size is reduced because of insufficient data, we do have data on some 
variables for firms that were excluded from our final sample because 
we did not have data on all of the variables used in our tests. We use 
these data to test whether there are significant differences in key 
variables used in our tests between firms included and excluded in our 
sample.  
 
Table 13 shows that LBOs that are excluded from our sample do 
not differ significantly in leverage, average seniority, incidence of 
financial distress, the structure of equity financing, the frequency of 
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various investor-controlled LBOs, or board composition. Not 
surprisingly, Table 13 shows that firms excluded from our sample are 
significantly smaller. Two data requirements for our tests tend to 
exclude smaller firms. First, we require that firms be publicly traded 
before the LBO so that we can calculate a buyout premium. Since, on 
average, publicly traded firms are larger than privately held firms, our 
sample will be biased towards larger firms. Second, we require that 
firms disclose post-LBO performance. Firms are required to make 
these disclosures only when they finance the LBO using publicly traded 
securities. Privately financed LBOs are likely to be smaller. Table 13 
also shows that there is no significant difference in post-LBO firm 
performance between firms in and out of the sample. While pre-LBO 
operating margins are significantly higher, post-LBO operating margins 
and changes in post-LBO operating margins are not statistically 
different for firms excluded from our sample from those that are 
included. Finally, we find that the average maturity of the debt is 
statistically significantly shorter for excluded firms, which suggests 
that LBOs left out of our sample may use different types of debt 
financing. More important to the interpretation of our results is 
whether the relation between debt and equity financing and the 
monitoring role that buyout specialists play is also different.  
 
We have 20 excluded observations for which we have data on 
equity ownership. We use these data to test whether LBOs controlled 
by various types of investors excluded from our sample are financed 
with a different debt structure than those included in our sample. 
Table 14 reports differences in average maturity, average seniority, 
and frequency of financial distress for buyout specialist-, management-
, and other investor-controlled LBOs that are included and excluded 
from the final sample. The results in Table 14 show that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the structure of the debt and the 
frequency of financial distress for LBOs led by different types of 
investors for deals included and excluded from the final sample.  
 
We also have board composition data on the 20 excluded LBOs. 
We use these data to examine the extent to which buyout specialists 
versus other outside investors monitor the LBO via board 
representation for firms out of the sample. For firms out of the sample, 
buyout specialists have 26.12% (median value of 21.43%) of the 
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board seats on a board, with an average of 7.82 seats (median value 
of 8.00 seats) for LBOs that they control. The percentage of board 
seats is not statistically significantly different from that of buyout 
specialist-controlled LBOs included in the final sample (reported in 
Table 12) (p value for test of differences in means is 0.17; medians, 
0.15), nor is board size (p value for test of difference in means is 
0.77; medians, 0.78). For firms out of the sample, other outside 
investors have 4.17% (median value of 4.17%) of the board seats on 
a board of an average size of 5.66 seats (median value of 8.00 seats) 
for LBOs that they control. Again, the percentage of board seats is not 
statistically different from that of outside investor LBOs included in the 
sample (reported in Table 12) (p value for test of differences in means 
is 0.40; medians, 0.53), nor is board size (p value for test of 
difference in means is 0.46; medians, 0.54). These findings suggest 
that buyout specialists more actively monitor LBOs via board 
membership compared to other outside investors for LBOs excluded 
from the final sample as well as those that are included.  
 
We are not able to test how the relationship between debt 
structure and post-LBO performance varies across different types of 
controlling investors for firms out of the sample. For these firms, we 
do not have data on all three of these variables; this is the primary 
reason why these firms are excluded from our final sample.  
 
To the limited extent that we can empirically test for potential 
sample biases, the results suggest that our findings are not driven by 
a sample selection bias. Even though our sample is biased towards 
larger publicly financed transactions, the relationship between debt 
and equity structure and the buyout specialists' monitoring role in 
LBOs they control is not likely to be significantly different from that of 
smaller, privately financed transactions that are excluded from our 
sample. Of course, because we are not able to empirically test whether 
our results hold for privately financed LBOs for which we have no data, 
we can not definitively conclude that our results would hold for these 
transactions.  
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9. Conclusion  
 
Ever since Berle and Means (1932), the classic agency problem 
is how investors control managers. Jensen's insight was that a high 
level of debt is one way to insure managers have incentives to 
maximize the value of the firm (see Jensen, 1986, 1989). Yet, as 
Smith and Warner (1979) showed in their seminal article, there are 
significant agency costs in relying on debt to motivate managers. The 
missing piece has been the absence of active investors. Buyout 
specialists are professional active investors. When they control the 
LBO, they monitor management, providing a substitute for debt as a 
disciplining device free of the agency and bankruptcy costs Smith and 
Warner (1979) identify. We find that: (1) when buyout specialists 
control the majority of the post-LBO equity, the LBO transaction is 
likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior debt and 
subsequently less likely to default; (2) LBO performance only increases 
with tighter debt terms for LBOs in which buyout specialists are not 
involved; and (3) buyout specialists have greater board representation 
on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively monitor managers. 
These three findings support the general hypothesis that the presence 
of an active equity investor, such as a buyout specialist, influences the 
choice of debt structure as well as long-term firm performance. 
Further research can focus on whether and under what circumstances 
the presence of active investors of various types will influence the debt 
structure of firms and their subsequent performance.  
 
Notes  
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Appendix  
Table 1: Data availability and frequency of financial distress for a sample of 
64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 
 
a Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. 
b Percentage of LBOs experiencing financial distress is calculated using the reduced 
sample where financial data are available. 
Table 2: Characteristics of equity financing for a sample of 64 leveraged 
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 
 
aExamples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. 
bExamples of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and 
Hallmark Cards. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of debt financing for different type of investor-
controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 
to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
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    *Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
    **Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
    ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and 
management-controlled LBOs and between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and 
other outside investor-controlled LBOs is tested. Difference in means tested using a 
standard t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. 
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.    
c Total debt is the amount of debt outstanding at the time the transaction is 
completed. 
d Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The 
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is 
tested using a Chi-square test. 
e Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
f Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds]. 
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Table 4: Default rates and debt characteristics by year of deal completion for 
different type of investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged 
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parenthesis). 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
NA=not applicable 
a Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
b Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt * 
2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds]. 
c Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. 
d Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
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Table 5: Differences in financial and buyout characteristics for different type 
of investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed 
from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a 
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Table 5 (continued) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and 
management-controlled LBOs and between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and 
other outside investor-controlled LBOs is tested. Difference in means tested using a 
standard t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data 
collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. Subscripted 
time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, eg., t+1=first full fiscal post LBO 
year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year. 
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
c The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the 
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined 
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors. 
d Total assets are written up after the LBO is completed to reflect buyout price. 
Because of this accounting change, total assets in the year before the buyout will be 
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relatively low. For the year before the buyout, total assets are the total assets 
reported the first year after the LBO is completed plus asset sales during the first year. 
For similar adjustments to pre-buyout assets, see Kaplan (1989) and Denis (1996). 
e Industry market adjusted monthly returns are calculated by taking the average 
holding period return for all firms in two-digit SIC code industry minus the equal 
weighted market return. The holding period is one year before the LBO completion. 
 
Table 6: Regression coefficient estimates for debt maturity and seniority 
characteristics for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 
1989 (p-values in parentheses). 
 
 
a Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
b Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other –industrial revenue bonds]. 
c Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout 
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more 
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or 
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor 
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the 
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sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso 
Company. 
d All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. 
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full 
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year. 
e The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the 
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined 
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors. 
 
Table 7: Logistic coefficient estimates for the likelihood of financial distress 
for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values 
in parentheses).a 
 
a Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. 
b Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout 
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specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more 
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or 
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor 
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the 
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso 
Company. 
c Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
d Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other –industrial revenue bonds]. 
e All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. 
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full 
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year. 
f Industry market adjusted monthly returns are calculated by taking the average 
holding period return for all firms in two-digit SIC code industry minus the equal 
weighted market return. The holding period is one year before the LBO completion. 
g The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the 
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined 
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors. 
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Table 8: Regression coefficient estimates for change in post-LBO 
performance, measured as the percentage change in (EBITDA/total sale), 
from t – 1 to t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 
1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a 
 
a All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. 
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full 
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year. 
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
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debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].  
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout 
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more 
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or 
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor 
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the 
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso 
Company. 
 
Table 9: Regression coefficient estimates for relative change in post-LBO 
performance, measured as the rank value of the percentage change in 
(EBITDA/total sales), from t – 1 to t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged 
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a 
 
a All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. 
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full 
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year. 
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
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years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other-industrial revenue bonds]. 
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout 
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more 
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or 
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor 
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the 
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso 
Company. 
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Table 10: Regression coefficient estimates for post-LBO performance, 
measured as (EBITDA /total capital)t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged 
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a
 
a All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. 
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full 
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.  
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
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debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].  
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout 
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more 
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or 
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor 
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the 
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso 
Company. 
 
Table 11: Selected CEO compensation characteristics for different type of 
investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts complete from 
1984 to 1989 (medians in parentheses).a 
 
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled firms and 
management-controlled firms and between buyout specialist controlled firms and other 
outside investor controlled firms is tested. Difference in means tested using a standard 
t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. Statistical 
difference in frequencies of number of firms tested using a chi-square test of 
association. All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion. 
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
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Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
c Stock ownership includes stock beneficially held as an equity partner in the LBO 
holding company as well as additional stock awarded/purchased during the first full 
post-LBO fiscal year. 
d Following Denis (1994), implied sensitivity of options is estimated as 0.6 times the 
implied sensitivity of the same fraction stake of common stock. 
e Stock is valued at the buyout premium price per share. 
 
Table 12: Selected board composition characteristics for different type of 
investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed 
from 1984 to 1989 (medians in parentheses).a 
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist controlled firms and 
management controlled firms and between buyout specialist controlled firms and other 
outside investor controlled firms is tested. Difference in means tested using a standard 
t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data collected 
within one full fiscal year of LBO completion. 
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
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companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
c Other includes academics, accountants, consultants, professional directors, lawyers, 
and medical professionals. 
 
Table 13: Differences in selected firm characteristics for firms included and 
excluded from the final sample for a beginning sample of 125 leveraged 
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a 
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*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means tested using a standard t-test. Difference in medians tested 
using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO 
completion except where noted. Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO 
completion date, e.g., t+1=first full fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO 
year. 
b Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. 
c Includes ESOP financing. 
d Other investors include insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit 
corporations, individual investors, individually organized limited partnerships, and 
miscellaneous corporations. Examples of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau 
Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
e Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. 
f Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The 
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is 
tested using a Chi-square test. 
g Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
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those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
h Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds]. 
 
Table 14: Differences in the relation between debt and equity financing for 
firms included and excluded from the final sample for a beginning sample of 
125 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in 
parentheses).a 
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
a Difference in means tested using a standard t-test. Difference in medians tested 
using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. 
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b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six 
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these 
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common 
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group. 
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; 
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance 
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors, 
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples 
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards. 
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time 
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving 
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank 
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing, 
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and 
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and 
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures. 
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes 
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing + bank 
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt 
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds]. 
d Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each 
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total 
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are 
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For 
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt 
outstanding is evenly amortized. 
e Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a 
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than 
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest 
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The 
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is 
tested using a Chi-square test. 
 
